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The Agreements Between Church and State: The 
Italian Perspective† 
Elena Ervas∗ 
This Article explores the recent approach of the Italian 
Constitutional Court regarding agreements between the Italian State 
and religious denomination, which regulate matters of common 
interest. The Italian approach is compared to the contemporary 
approach of the Spanish legal system. The Italian approach grants 
strong discretion in favor of the Government in this context, but by 
doing so, it risks inadequately protecting the religious freedom of 
religious denominations in light of current jurisprudence. Moreover, the 
broad discretion given to the Italian government seems not to be in line 
with the current jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights in defense of collective religious freedom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the implementation of the Republican Constitution and 
the end of the formal predominance of the Catholic Church in Italy, 
the topic of agreements between the State and religious 
denominations was particularly debated.1 Recently, the Italian 
Constitutional Court has issued a decision concerning the right of 
religious, non-Catholic denominations to stipulate agreements with 
the State.2 Paradoxically, the case that led to that decision was 
brought before the court by the Union of Atheist and Rationalist 
Agnostics (UAAR), after the UAAR requested to start negotiations 
to reach an agreement with the Italian State, as provided by the 
Italian Constitution.3 This Article explores the issue of the right to 
stipulate an agreement with the State as considered by the Italian 
Constitutional Court. Before turning to the recent case law, Part I 
will give an introductory perspective on the Italian legal framework 
 
 1.  See Francesco Alicino, La legislazione sulla base di intese. I test delle religioni 
“altre” e degli ateismi, Cacucci Editore, Bari, 2013 (It.); Nicola Colaianni, Confessioni 
religiose e intese: contributo all’interpretazione dell’art. 8 della Costituzione (Editore Cacucci 
1990) (It.); Nicola Colaianni, Le intese nella società multireligiosa: verso nuove disuguaglianze?, 
19 STATO CHIESE E PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE (2012) (It.); Jlia Pasquali Cerioli, 
L’approvazione delle intese ex art. 8, 3° comma, Cost. nella XVI legislatura: luci e ombre di una 
nuova «stagione», 2 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA (2013) (It.); Pierluigi 
Consorti,  1984–2014: le stagioni delle intese e la «terza età» dell’art. 8, ultimo comma, della 
Costituzione, 1 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA, (2014) (It.). 
 2.  Corte Cost., 10 marzo 2016, n.52, G.U. 2016 (It.). 
 3.  Art. 8 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“All religious denominations are equally free 
before the law. Denominations other than Catholicism have the right to self-organisation 
according to their own statutes, provided these do not conflict with Italian law. Their relations 
with the State are regulated by law, based on agreements with their respective 
representatives.”). The decision of the Italian Constitutional Court concerned a request 
submitted by an atheistic association. However, the court’s reasoning affects the general 
principles governing the agreements between the Italian State and each religious 
denomination. See Annalisa Poggi, Una sentenza “preventiva” sulle prossime richieste di Intese 
da parte di confessioni religiose? (in margine alla sentenza n. 52 della Corte costituzionale), 6 
FEDERALISMI.IT (2016) (It.). 
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for church-state relations. Part II will compare the Italian system to 
the Spanish system, which has a similar tradition and history. 
I. THE ITALIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE RELEVANT 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Republican Constitution of 1948 pays particular attention 
to religious freedom both as an individual and as a collective right. 
According to constitutional jurisprudence, the Italian legal system is 
informed by the principle of laicità, one of the cardinal principles of 
the State.4 The Italian concept of laicità entails a state that is neutral 
toward religious and non-religious beliefs and that guarantees equal 
protection for both. In a system of separation between church and 
state, laicità does not imply the State’s indifference toward religions, 
but rather the State’s guarantee to safeguard a religiously and 
culturally pluralistic regime. Moreover, it fosters the defence of both 
the individual and the collective side of religious freedom.5 
Article 19 of the Italian Constitution affirms an individual’s 
freedom to profess and manifest a religious belief, in private or in 
public.6 The only limit to religious expression is the respect of public 
morality.7 The institutional side of religious freedom received specific 
protection in Articles 78 and 8,9 which describe the relationship 
between the State and religious organizations, as explained below. 
Articles 7 and 8 concern fundamental principles of the legal system.10 
The Italian Constitution affirms the independence and 
sovereignty of both the State and the Catholic Church, each within 
 
 4.  Corte Cost., 11–12 aprile 1989, n.203, G.U. 1989, 5 (It.). 
 5.  Id.; see also Alessandro Ferrari & Silvio Ferrari, Religion and the Secular State: The 
Italian Case, in RELIGION AND THE SECULAR STATE: NATIONAL REPORTS 445, 447–48 
(Donlu D. Thayer ed., 2015). 
 6.  Art. 19 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Anyone is entitled to freely profess their 
religious belief in any form, individually or with others, and to promote them and celebrate 
rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality.”). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. art. 7 (“The State and the Catholic Church are independent and sovereign, each 
within its own sphere. Their relations are regulated by the Lateran pacts. Amendments to such 
Pacts which are accepted by both parties shall not require the procedure of 
constitutional amendments.”). 
 9.  Id. art. 8. 
 10.  Ferrari & Ferrari, supra note 5, at 449.  
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its own sphere.11 Regarding non-Catholic denominations, the 
constitution recognizes the right to internal autonomy and free 
organization, provided they do not compromise the fundamental 
principles of the Italian legal system.12 In pursuance of the principle 
of religious autonomy, the constitution provides that every form of 
interaction between the State and religion should be governed by 
agreements between the State and the religious institution.13 
Accordingly, the constitution provides two methods to regulate the 
relations between the State and a religious denomination. 
The second paragraph of Article 714 contains the first method 
and is reserved for the Catholic Church, which has historically 
enjoyed a significant role on the Italian peninsula. According to the 
constitution, the relationship between the State and the Catholic 
Church is ruled by a Concordat.15 The constitution explicitly refers 
to the Lateran Pacts that were signed in 1929 and later amended by 
the Pacts of Villa Madama in 1984 to make them compatible with 
the principles of the democratic system.16 The second method 
concerns religious denominations other than the Catholic Church. 
The third paragraph of Article 8 provides for a special instrument, 
called Intesa, which is an agreement reached by a religious 
representative and the government.17 The content of this agreement, 
once implemented by a law of the Italian Parliament, regulates 
relations between the State and the religious denomination.18  
 
 11.  Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“The State and the Catholic Church are 
independent and sovereign, each within its own sphere.”). 
 12.  Id. art. 8. 
 13.  See id. art. 7–8. 
 14.  Id. art. 7. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  On February 18, 1984, the Italian State and the Holy Church agreed to replace the 
old Lateran Pacts of 1929 with a new agreement in order to regulate the relations between the 
State and the Catholic Church in Italy. Legge 25 marzo 1985, n.121, G.U. Mar. 25, n.85 
(It.). With the Pacts of Villa Madama began a new era for the relation between the State and 
the Catholic Church, based on the principle of laicità, the separation between State and 
Church, mutual collaboration, reciprocal independence, and respect. For the full text of the 
Pact of Villa Madama see http://presidenza.governo.it/USRI/confessioni/accordo_indice
.html. The Italian State ratified this agreement in 1985. L. n. 121/1985 (It.). 
 17.  Art. 8 para. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Their relations with the State are 
regulated by law, based on agreements with their respective representatives.”). 
 18.  Id. 
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The second paragraph of Article 7 and the third paragraph of 
Article 8 express the so-called bilateral principle.19 The fathers of the 
Republican Constitution wanted to avoid a unilateral imposition of 
legislation regulating religious matters, which would have risked 
inadequate protection of religious freedom and the distinctive 
features or needs of the existing religions in the State.20 According to 
the constitution, the State should use the instrument of the 
agreement to deal with the legal organization of a denomination and 
this agreement should be tailored to the needs and features of each 
denomination.21 The main purpose of the instrument was not only to 
recognize the autonomy of religious organizations but also to allow 
them to assert their distinctions and demands through a separate and 
individual negotiation with the State.22 Once signed by the President 
of the Council of Ministers and the religious representative and 
approved by Parliament, these agreements are the base for any law 
involving the rapport between the State and the religious 
denomination.23 To protect the autonomy and liberty of the religious 
 
 19.  Ferrari & Ferrari, supra note 5, at 452. 
 20.  Marco Canonico, La stipulazione di intese con lo Stato: diritto delle confessioni 
religiose o libera scelta del Governo?, STATO, CHIESE E PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE, Apr. 23, 
2012, at 1, 1 (It.), http://www.statoechiese.it/images/uploads/articoli_pdf/canonico_la
_stipulazione2.pdf. 
 21.  Id. at 3. 
 22.  See Corte Cost., 16 luglio 2002, n.346, G.U. 2002, 4 (It.) (“Agreements referred 
to in art. 8, paragraph three, are in fact the instrument provided by the constitution for the 
regulation of the relationships of religious denominations with the State for aspects related to 
the specific feature of the individual confessions or requiring derogations from general law.”) 
(English translation by the author). 
 23.  See Canonico, supra note 20, at 1. In absence of any specific legislative indication, 
the approval procedure of the Agreement has followed a practice suggested by doctrinal 
interpretation during negotiations for the Agreement with the Waldensians in 1984; this 
procedure was considered a direct application of the constitution which requires that any 
relationship between State and religious denomination be ruled by a state law based on the 
agreement. See Pierluigi Consorti, 1984–2014: le stagioni delle intese e la «terza età» dell’art. 8, 
ultimo comma, della Costituzione, 1 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 90, 94, 
98 (2014) (It.). In 1988, legislation gave the competence for the State to the Council of 
Minister. Id.; see also Legge 23 agosto 1988, n.400, G.U. Aug. 23, 1988, n.214 (It.). For the 
Intesa with the Waldensians, see Testo dell’Intesa tra il Governo della Repubblica e la Tavola 
Valdese in attuazione dell’articolo 8, comma terzo, della Costituzione fermata il 21 febbraio 1984 
e approvata con legge 11 agosto 1984 [Text of the Intesa between the Government of the Republic 
and the Waldensians for implementation of Article 8, third paragraph, of the constitution signed 
on 21 February 1984 and approved by law no. 449 11 August 1984], It. Waldensians, Feb. 21, 
1984, https://www.chiesavaldese.org/documents/intesa1984.pdf (It.) [hereinafter Intesa 
with Waldensians]. 
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group, an agreement can be modified only through a new agreement 
between the State and the denomination.24 
It is important to specify that a religious denomination is not 
obliged to enter into an agreement with the State in order to enjoy 
religious freedom. In the absence of a general law on religious 
freedom, religious denominations that have not reached an 
agreement with the State continue to be ruled by legge sui culti 
ammessi (law on admitted cults).25 This piece of legislation was 
implemented during the fascist dictatorship and is still in force 
today.26 Despite the Constitutional Court’s efforts to gradually adapt 
this law to the constitutional principles of equality and liberty, it still 
admits a strong government power of control over religious groups’ 
activities.27 Even if not formally obliged, a religious denomination 
could have a strong interest in reaching a more favorable status 
through an agreement. Moreover, another strong motivation arises 
from the content of these agreements; they tend to have a 
 
 24.  Ferrari & Ferrari, supra note 5, at 452; see, e.g., Intesa with Waldensians, supra note 
23, at 5 (“Changes will be made with the stipulation of a new Intesa with the consequent 
submission to Parliament of a special draft law of approval, to the senses of Article 8 of the 
constitution.”) (English translation by the author). 
 25.  Legge 24 giugno 1929, n.1159, G.U. June 24, 1929 (It.). 
 26.  See Ferrari & Ferrari, supra note 5, at 454; see also Consorti, supra note 23, at 102 
(“The law on admitted cults is ‘not only chronologically obsolete, but ontologically 
unconstitutional because it is based on the “logical, prejudicial assumption’ of the religion of 
State, ‘or rather on the principle of Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, as religion of the 
State;’ legislation still in force despite being overcome, fascist, and anti-historical.”) (English 
translation by the author). 
 27.  Ferrari & Ferrari, supra note 5, at 456. For example, the royal decree that 
implemented the law on admitted cults granted a permission to worshippers of a permitted cult 
to keep public meetings for the fulfillment of religious ceremonies or other acts of worship in 
buildings open to the public, provided that meetings were authorized by a minister of worship 
whose nomination had been duly approved by the Interior Minister of the State. Regio 
Decreto 28 febbraio 1930, n.289, G.U. 1930 Feb. 28, 1930 (It.). However, the 
Constitutional Court declared this provision unconstitutional. Corte Cost., 24 novembre 
1958, n.59, G.U. 1958 (It.). According to the court, this provision conflicted with article 19 
of the Italian Constitution, which grants freedom of religion in any form, individually or with 
others, and to celebrate rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public 
morality. Id. Although it raised constitutional concerns, the same court considered article 3 of 
the law on admitted cults legitimate. L. n. 1159/1929 (“The appointment of ministers of 
religion other than the [official] religion of the State must be notified to the Interior Ministry 
for approval. No civil effect can be recognized to acts of ministry carried out by ministers of 
worship if their nomination has not obtained government approval.”) (English translation by 
the author); Corte Cost., 24 novembre 1958, n.59, G.U. 1958 (It.). 
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standardized content and have become an instrument used by 
political power to regulate a variety of affairs that would potentially 
interest all religious denominations. Such agreements may include 
recognition of religious festivities, the possibility of establishing 
religious schools and the recognition of diplomas granted therein, 
the possibility for worship ministers to provide spiritual assistance in 
hospitals or prisons, and the allocation of financial charges.28 An 
agreement, therefore, has become a sort of ideal destination for 
religious denominations, which makes it a privilege held by a 
fortunate few.29 
Aside from the Catholic Church, six other denominations signed 
agreements with the State in the late 1980s and early 1990s that 
have been approved by Parliament: the Waldensians (1984), the 
Christian Churches of the Seventh-day Adventists (1986), the 
Assemblies of God (1986), the Union of Jewish Communities 
(1987), the Christian Evangelical-Baptist Union (1993), and the 
Lutheran Church (1993).30 In 2007, agreements with other 
denominations were also signed, but they long remained “ghost 
agreements” because they were approved by Parliament five years 
after their signing (except in the case of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
who are still waiting for approval).31 In 2015, the Istituto Buddista 
 
 28.  See Intesa with Waldensians, supra note 23. 
 29.  Andrea Guazzarotti, Le minoranze religiose tra potere politico e funzione 
giurisdizionale: Bontà e limiti del modello italiano, 2 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 213, 216 
(2002) (It.). 
 30.  Legge 11 agosto 1984, n.449, G.U. Aug. 11, 1984 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with 
Waldensians, which was originally signed on Feb. 21, 1984); Legge 22 novembre 1988, n.516, 
G.U. Nov. 22, 1988 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with Christian Churches of the Seventh-day 
Adventists, which was originally signed on Dec. 29, 1986); Legge 22 novembre 1988, n.517, 
G.U. Nov. 22, 1988 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with Assemblies of God in Italy, which was originally 
signed on Dec. 29, 1986); Legge 8 marzo 1989, n.101, G.U. Mar. 8, 1989 (It.) (ratifying 
Intesa with the Union of Jewish Communities in Italy, which was originally signed on Feb. 27, 
1987); Legge 12 aprile 1995, n.116, G.U. Apr. 12, 1995 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with the 
Christian Evangelical-Baptist Union in Italy, which was originally signed on Mar. 29, 1993) 
(later modified by Legge 12 marzo 2012, n.34, G.U. Mar. 12, 2012); Legge 29 novembre 
1995, n.520, G.U. Nov. 29, 1995 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with the Lutheran Church, which was 
originally signed on Apr. 20, 1993). For full text of each law, see http://presidenza.governo.it
/USRI/confessioni/intese_indice.html. 
 31.  See Consorti, supra note 23, at 106. In April 2007, agreements were signed with 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, (for full text of the Intesa see http://presidenza.governo.it
/USRI/ufficio_studi/normativa/Intesa_Congregazione_cristiana_testimoni_geova.pdf), the 
Italian Buddhist Union, the Italian Hindu Union, the Apostolic Church in Italy, The Church 
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Italiano Soka Gakkai (IBISG) also reached an agreement with 
the State.32 
Some commentators highlight problems that arise from a strict 
application of the bilateral principle.33 On one hand, the need for 
representative institutions at a national level is problematic for some 
denominations that do not have a strong institutional structure, such 
as Islam.34 On the other hand, there has been a focus on “the 
excessive amount of discretion that the public powers possess in 
deciding whether to accept” the request of a denomination to begin 
negotiations to reach an agreement.35 
A. The UAAR Request to Launch Negotiations Ex Article 8 
Paragraph 3 
Considering the large amount of discretion left to public powers, 
it is interesting to analyse the outcome of a recent decision of the 
Italian Constitutional Court.36 The decision is the final point of a 
long process started in 1996, as explained below. 
The Italian Constitution protects freedom of religion in Article 
19: “Anyone is entitled to freely profess their religious belief in any 
form, individually or with others, and to promote them and celebrate 
 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese. Legge 30 luglio 
2012, n.126, G.U. July 30, 2012 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with the Greek Orthodox 
Archdiocese); Legge 30 luglio 2012, n.127, G.U. July 30, 2012 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints); Legge 30 luglio 2012, n.128, G.U. July 30, 
2012 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with the Apostolic Church in Italy); Legge 31 decembre 2012, 
n.245, G.U. Dec. 31, 2012 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with the Italian Buddhist Union); Legge 31 
decembre 2012, n.246, G.U. Dec. 31, 2012 (It.) (ratifying Intesa with the Italian 
Hindu Union). 
 32.  The agreement was signed on June 27, 2015, and approved June 28, 2016. Legge 
28 giugno 2016, n.130, G.U. July 15, 2016, n.164 (It.); GOVERNO ITALIANO PRESIDENZA 
DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI, SERVIZIO PER I RAPPORTI CON LE CONFESSIONI RELIGIOSE E 
PER LE RELAZIONI ISTITUZIONALI, http://presidenza.governo.it/USRI/confessioni/intese
_indice.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (It.). 
 33.  See infra notes 35–36. 
 34.  ANDREA PIN, THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF MUSLIM MINORITIES IN ITALY, 77 
(2016) (“Traditionally, Islam has no hierarchy and, pursuant to that, no hierarchical structure 
has appeared in Italy. While many individuals and organizations claim to be representative of 
the Italian Islamic community, this is hardly confirmed by the religious practices and attitudes 
of a Muslim community that is deeply divided based on nationality and personal 
religious  inclinations.”). 
 35.  Ferrari & Ferrari, supra note 5, at 453. 
 36.  Corte Cost., 10 marzo 2016, n.52, G.U. 2016, (It.). 
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rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public 
morality.”37 Even though the text mentions only religious sentiment, 
it is without doubt that a democratic and pluralistic society also 
protects a non-religious attitude, such as the profession of atheism or 
agnosticism. On these premises, the UAAR assumed entitlement to 
the same system framed by the constitution for religious 
denominations.38 Accordingly, in 1996 the UAAR submitted a 
request to the Italian government to launch negotiations to reach an 
agreement under Article 8, Paragraph 3 of the Italian Constitution.39 
The government refused the application on the grounds that the 
practice of atheism, asserted by the association in question, was not 
eligible to be considered as equivalent to a religious faith.40 The 
decision denied the organization’s religious nature and, accordingly, 
the capacity to gain access to the system conceived only to religious 
entities by the Italian Constitution.41 
Setting aside the issue of the nature of the UAAR, the 
government’s decision revived an interesting debate on the existence 
of a right for a religious denomination to initiate negotiations for an 
agreement under Article 8, Paragraph 3 of the Italian Constitution, 
and on the nature of the refusal to launch such negotiations. The 
debate focused on whether a religious denomination had a 
constitutional right to initiate the negotiation process for a stipulated 
agreement with the State with the consequence that in case of 
government’s refusal this right could invoke protection in court.42 
 
 37.  Art. 19 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
 38.  Nicola Colaianni, Ateismo de combat e intesa con lo stato, 15 ASSOCIAZIONE 
ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI [A.I.C.] 1 (2014) (It.). 
 39.  FRANCESCO ALICINO, la legislazione sulla base di intese. I test delle religioni 
“altre” e degli ateismi, 218 (Cacucci Editore, 2013) (It.). 
 40.  The Government affirmed that the profession of atheism was equivalent to religion 
with respect to free exercise, in any form, individual and associate, provided that it did not 
produce an act contrary to public morality (Article 19 of the Italian Constitution). However, 
atheism could not be regulated in a manner explicitly set out by Article 8 of the Italian 
Constitution for religious confessions only. Il Sottosegretario di Stato alla Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri, Risposta del Consiglio dei Ministri sulla richiesta d’intesa, UNIONE 
DEGLI ATEI E DEGLI AGNOSTICI RAZIONALISTI (5 DIC. 2003), https://www.uaar.it/laicita
/ateismo_e_legislazione/17e.html/ (It.). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See Jlia Pasquali Cerioli, Accesso alle Intese e Pluralismo Religioso: Convergenze 
Apicali di Giurisprudenza sulla “Uguale Libertà” di Avviare Trattative ex Art. 8 Cost., Terzo 
Comma, 26 STATO, CHIESE E PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE (2013) (It.); Colaianni, supra 
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In the case in question, the government objected to this 
interpretation43. For the State, the refusal to start negotiations was 
absolutely a free political act, and as such, it could not be subject to 
judicial review.44 Accordingly, the government argued, the UAAR 
could not claim that the initiation of negotiations for a concordat 
was mandatory.45 
B. The Reasoning of the Italian Court of Cassation 
Before the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, the 
UAAR’s request was considered before two of the highest Italian 
courts: first the Council of State and then the Court of Cassation.46 
Both courts focused on the whether the government could refuse to 
start negotiations with a religious denomination, and both 
reached similar conclusions.47 The Council of State adopted a 
protective approach: once it is proven that an applicant has the 
features of a religious denomination, the government is obliged to 
accommodate the request to start negotiations.48 However, the 
government ultimately retains the power to decline to enter into an 
agreement or to decline to translate an agreement into state law.49 
The Court of Cassation reached the same conclusion.50 
According to the court’s reasoning, the third paragraph of Article 8 
must be read in light of the first paragraph of the same article, which 
states that all religious creeds are equal.51 Therefore, the system of 
agreements would pursue the same goal of guaranteeing equal 
religious liberty for all denominations. In other words, the 
agreements protect the religious organizations’ independence, 
equality before the law, and right to be different from one another. 
 
note 1, at 1; Fabio Corvaja, Rimedi Giuridici Contro il Diniego di Intesa con le Confessioni 
Religiose,  2 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (2002) (It.). 
 43.  Corte Cost., 10 marzo 2016, n.52, G.U. 2016, at 2, 3 (It.). 
 44.  Id. at 13. 
 45.  Id. at 2, 3. 
 46.  Cass., sez. un., 12 marzo 2013, n.16305, 2013 (It.); Cons. Stato, 18 novembre 
2011, n.6083, 2011 (It.). 
 47. See Cass., sez. un., 12 marzo 2013; Cons. Stato, 18 novembre 2011. 
 48.  Cons. Stato, 18 novembre 2011, at 6. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Cass., sez. un., 12 marzo 2013, at 9, 10. 
 51.  Id. at 8. 
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The possibility that each religious group may conduct independent 
negotiations with the State permits each denomination to reach an 
agreement whose content is, as much as possible, specifically tailored 
to the needs of each group. For this reason, the court concluded that 
this system could not be left to the absolute discretion of the State 
because of the risk of prejudice and the requirement of the equal 
protection for all religious faiths.52 Therefore, to support equal 
protection, the State must at least accommodate the request of the 
religious denomination to begin agreement negotiations.53  
C. The Decision of the Italian Constitutional Court 
The case was brought before the Italian Constitutional Court.54 
Under the court’s reasoning, the proper significance of the 
constitutional provisions regarding the concordats consists only in 
the extension to non-Catholic faiths of the “bilateral method” 
already provided by Article 7 for the Pacts with the Holy See.55 As 
such, the regulations of the religious affairs between the temporal 
and spiritual sphere must be based on a previous agreement whose 
content is dependent upon the intentions of the parties.56 The core 
purpose of the accord’s system is both to permit religious groups to 
give value to the distinct features of their individual religious faiths 
and to convince the State to take the individual needs of each 
religious group into account.57 The agreement in itself is an 
instrument that reflects the shared intention of both parties; as such, 
the necessity of sharing will have some consequences not only at the 
conclusion phase of the agreement but also at the previous step 
regarding the choice to launch negotiations. The system of 
cooperation conceived by the constitution assumes the presence of 
consensus on both sides. Consequently, the government cannot 
impose regulation on a religious entity that does not discipline its 
relations within the temporal sphere; however, the State is also free 
 
 52.  Id. at 9, 10. 
 53.  Id. at 8. 
 54.  Corte Cost., 10 marzo 2016, n.52, G.U. 2016, (It.). 
 55.  Id. at 10–11. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Canonico, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
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not to sign an agreement if it considers that the requirements, 
interest, or opportunity are not met. Therefore, a right to stipulate 
the concordat cannot be invoked.58 
This also has a direct logical implication on the claim to have a 
right to start negotiations. The court reasoned that, because a 
religious group lacks any entitlement to the successful conclusion of 
negotiations, and hence to the conclusion of a concordat, the claim 
of a right to start negotiations is meaningless. The bilateral method 
inherent within the rationale of Article 8, Paragraph 3 of the Italian 
Constitution requires a common intention of the parties not only to 
conduct and to conclude negotiations but also to launch them in the 
first place.59 Consequently, the idea of the bilateral method prevents 
the judge both from reviewing the decision of the competent state 
authority and from forcing the government to accommodate the 
request of the religious party.60 Thus, the court reasoned that there is 
no right to stipulate the agreement, and consequently, there is also 
no right to start negotiations aimed at concluding that agreement. 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court relied on other arguments 
of institutional and constitutional significance to sustain its 
reasoning. For the court, this is a context strictly related to the 
political discretion of the government. The changing reality of 
national and political relations could lead the government to decide 
that it is not appropriate to grant the request to launch negotiations 
at a particular moment or with a particular social group. According 
to the court, currently the Intesa is clearly also used as an instrument 
of social and political legitimization.61 This assessment of 
appropriateness could induce the government to refrain from 
 
 58.  See also Corte Cost., 16 luglio 2002, n.346, G.U. 2002, n.29 (It.). 
 59.  Corte Cost., 10 marzo 2016, at 11, 13. 
 60.  Id. at 10–11 (“It is precluded first and foremost by the reference to the bilateral 
method inherent within the rationale of Article 8(3) of the constitution which—especially 
given the absence of specific procedural provision—requires a joint intention of the parties not 
only to conduct and conclude negotiations, but also to launch them in the first place. The 
assertion that a refusal to launch negotiations is subject to review before the courts 11/15—
with the resulting possibility for mandatory enforcement of the ‘right’ recognised, and the 
related obligation for the Government to launch negotiations—would by contrast be at 
odds  with the bilateral method provided for under the constitutional provision 
under examination.”). 
 61.  Id. at 12. 
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granting even the implicit de facto legitimizing effect that an 
association could obtain from the mere initiation of negotiations. 
Moreover, the normative scenario lacks a general law on religious 
freedom that would clearly impose such an obligation on the State.62 
Finally, the court noted that, notwithstanding the broad 
discretion granted to the state, this discretion is not absolute. The 
court noted that article 2(3)(1) of Law 400/1988 states that “acts 
concerning the relations provided for under Article 8 of the 
Constitution must be resolved upon within the Council of 
Ministers.”63 According to the court, this means that the 
government retains a political responsibility for its determination.64 
As such, the government may be held responsible on a political level 
for that decision before Parliament, but not before the courts. To 
conclude, the Constitutional Court held that the refusal of the 
request to launch negotiations is a political act that falls within the 
margin of discretion of the government.65  
Some suggestions may derive from a comparative approach. This 
Article will now discuss the approach of another European legal 
system, comparable to the Italian system, regarding church-state 
relations. Specifically, a similar issue was decided by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court in 2001, which partly reached a more 
protective approach to religious denominations.66 
II. THE SPANISH CONTEXT: RELEVANT 
CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 marked a substantial 
innovation in the legal treatment of relations between the State and 
religious denominations. Except for the short break of the Second 
 
 62.  Id. at 14. 
 63.  Id. at 12. 
 64.  Id. at 12–13 (“The reservation to the Council of Ministers of competence over the 
decision as to whether or not to launch negotiations has the effect of establishing the 
possibility—in accordance with the principles of parliamentary government—of effective 
control by Parliament from the stage preliminary to the actual launching of negotiations, a 
control which is certainly justified in the light of the delicate interests protected by Article 8(3) 
of the Constitution.”). 
 65.  Id. at 13. 
 66.  S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 65, p. 83) (Spain). 
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Republic (1931–1939), the confessional model was a constant in 
Spanish constitutional history. In particular, the State had a long 
tradition of favoring the Catholic Church.67 During Franco’s 
dictatorship, Catholicism was the state-established religion and was 
the only religion to receive official protection.68 Ceremonies and 
other expressions of worship were authorized only if they were 
Catholic. Moreover, the expression of other religions was tolerated 
only when confined to the private sphere.69 The new Republican 
regime represented a substantial step toward a new concept of 
religious freedom: Spain transitioned from a confessional state to a 
secular state based on the principles of religious freedom, equality, 
and cooperation between the State and religious denominations.70 
The essential provision within the constitutional text is Article 
16.71 Paragraph 1 recognizes religious freedom as a fundamental 
right of individuals and communities and provides that “freedom of 
ideology, religion and worship of individuals and communities is 
guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression than may 
be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law.”72 This 
entails the recognition of a sphere of freedom free from any form of 
coercion of the State in religious matters and includes the right to 
not be obliged to declare ideology, religion, or personal conviction.73 
In addition to the protection of this internal dimension, this freedom 
entails an external dimension of agere licere, the right to manifest or 
 
 67.  Zoila Combalía & María Roca, Religion and the Secular State of Spain, in 
RELIGION AND THE SECULAR STATE supra note 5, at 656, 657. 
 68.  Id. at 630. 
 69.  Id.; Miguel Rodríguez Blanco, Spain, in RELIGION AND DISCRIMINATION LAW IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 307, 310 (Mark Hill QC ed., 2012). 
 70.  Maria Elena Olmos Ortega, Personalidad juridical civil de las Entidades religiosas y 
Registro de Entidades Religiosas, in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y SU REGULACIÒN LEGAL: LA 
LEY ORGANICA DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA 576, 585 (Rafael Navarro-Valls et al. eds., 2009) 
(Spain); see also Combalía & Roca, supra note 67, at 658. 
 71.  C.E., B.O.E., n. 16, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“1. Freedom of ideology, religion and 
worship of individuals and communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their 
expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law. 2. No one may 
be compelled to make statements regarding his or her religion, beliefs or ideologies. 3. There 
shall be no State religion. The public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish 
society into account and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation with the 
Catholic Church and the other confessions.”). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  S.T.C., July 18, 2002 (B.O.E., No. 188, p. 51, 59) (Spain). 
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express religious beliefs, even collectively. The only limit to free 
expression of religious beliefs is the protection of public order.74 
A. The Principles of Positive Secularity and Cooperation Between State 
and Religion 
Article 16, Paragraph 3 of the Spanish Constitution75 affirms the 
so-called principle of positive secularity, which follows from the 
principles of neutrality and cooperation.76 On one hand, the State 
must not be confessional; on the other, it must have a positive 
attitude towards religion. Accordingly, the Spanish idea of secularism 
is closer to the Italian laicità. State neutrality does not require the 
State to adopt a stance of indifference toward religion in the name of 
a sort of “secular confessionality;”77 rather, the State recognizes and 
favors religious presence in society. The Spanish Constitution itself 
considers religion to be a present component of the Spanish 
community and requires public authorities to cooperate with the 
Catholic Church and other religious denominations to make the 
rights and freedoms of individuals and groups real and effective,78 as 
provided by Article 9 Paragraph 2.79 
 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  C.E., B.O.E. n. 16, para. 3 (“There shall be no State religion. The public 
authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall consequently 
maintain appropriate cooperation with the Catholic Church and the other confessions.”). 
 76.  Combalía & Roca, supra note 67, at 629–30. 
 77.  Javier Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion in the Case Law of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, 2001 BYU L. REV. 711, 717. 
 78.  S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 65, p. 83, 87) (Spain) (“[A]rt. 16.3 of the 
Constitution, after formulating a declaration of neutrality (SSTC 340/1993, of November 16, 
and 177/1996, of November 11), considers the religious component perceivable in Spanish 
society and orders public authorities to maintain ‘the consequent relations of cooperation with 
the Catholic Church and the other confessions, thus introducing an idea of non-confessionality 
or positive secularism that prevents any kind of fusion between religious and state purposes.’”) 
(English traslation by the author). 
 79.  C.E., B.O.E. n. 9, para. 2. (“It is incumbent upon the public authorities to 
promote conditions which ensure that the freedom and equality of individuals and of the 
groups to which they belong may be real and effective, to remove the obstacles which prevent 
or hinder their full enjoyment, and to facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, 
economic, cultural and social life.”). 
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B. Instruments of Cooperation Between State and Religion 
The Spanish legal system presents three levels that manifest the 
principle of cooperation between the State and religious 
denominations.80 The first instrument of cooperation is the 
possibility of a religious denomination to reach an agreement with 
the State. In 1979, the Spanish State and the Holy See signed four 
agreements concerning issues of common interest, such as the 
recognition of legal personhood to the Catholic Church in Spain, 
the right to receive religious education and teach religious classes, 
the right to give religious assistance to the armed forces, as well as 
agreements on fiscal and economic issues.81 In addition to the 
Concordat with the Holy See, article 7 of the Organic Law of 
Religious Freedom82 allows the government to sign cooperative 
agreements to regulate issues of common interest with registered 
religious groups of particular social significance, known as notorio 
arraigo or “well-known roots.”83 The law requires such 
arrangements to be approved by an act of Parliament.84 Agreements 
were signed with the Federations of Protestants, Jews, and Muslims 
 
 80.  Just as anticipation, in Spain there are religious denominations (1) that have 
reached an agreement with the State; (2) that have obtained registration in the Ministry of 
Justice’s Religious Entities Register; and (3) that, without being enrolled in the Register, exist 
only as religious entities in Spain. The three levels are described in this way by Judge Manuel 
Jiménez de Parga y Cabrera in S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 65, p. 83, at 91) (Spain). 
 81.  Acuerdo entre el Estado español y la Santa Sede sobre asuntos jurídicos. Acuerdo 
entre el Estado español y la Santa Sede sobre enseñanza y asuntos culturales. Acuerdo entre el 
Estado Español y la Santa Sede sobre la asistencia religiosa a las Fuerzas Armadas y el servicio 
militar de clérigos y religiosos. Acuerdo entre el Estado español y la Santa Sede sobre asuntos 
económicos. For the full text of the agreements, see B.O.E, n. 300, Jan. 3, 1979, p. 28781–
82, 28784–85 (Spain). 
 82.  Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 7 (B.O.E. 1980, 15955) (Spain) (“The 
State, taking into account the existing religious beliefs in Spanish society, shall, where 
appropriate, establish agreements or cooperation agreements with the Churches, Confessions 
and Religious Communities registered in the Register whose area and number of believers have 
reached deeply rooted in Spain. In any case, these agreements must be approved by Act of 
Parliament.”); see Martínez-Torrón, supra note 77, at 717. 
 83.  Several factors are considered to determine if a religious denomination is well 
rooted in the Spanish State: for example, the years of presence in the state, the number of 
believers, the performance of charitable activities, the participation in public life. The 
requirements and the recognition process have been detailed by the Royal Decree 593/2015 
(Spain), https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2015-8642. 
 84.  Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 7 (B.O.E. 1980, 15955) (Spain). 
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in 1992.85 These agreements followed the scheme of the Concordat 
with the Holy See. As in Italy, they provided a general legal 
framework for all religious confessions. In general, they give civil 
effect to religious marriages, allow religion classes in state schools, 
permit the ability to obtain fiscal benefits, and admit spiritual 
assistance for individuals in hospitals, prisons, military, or other 
public institutions.86 However, it is important to emphasize that the 
agreements “are not a constitutional requirement as they are in 
Italy.”87 The Spanish Constitution requires only cooperation between 
State and each religious denomination, but the way in which this 
should be carried out is not specified.88 
Moreover, different from those in Italy, these agreements are just 
one of the ways by which each religious denomination can relate to 
the Spanish State, in light of the principle of cooperation. The 
second level of protection is reserved for religious denominations 
that are recorded in the Ministry of Justice’s Religious Entities 
Register (the “Register”). This registration is voluntary and a 
precondition (in addition to well-known roots) to access any 
agreement with the State.89 The registration submission must present 
the requirements listed in article 5, paragraph 2 of Ley Organica de 
Libertad Religiosa (LOLR),  particularly the religious nature and 
 
 85.  Acuerdo de Cooperación del Estado con la Federación de Entidades Religiosas 
Evangélicas de España (B.O.E. 1992, 24853); Acuerdo de Cooperación del Estado con la 
Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España (B.O.E. 1992, 24854); Acuerdo de 
Cooperación del Estado con la Comisión Islámica de España (B.O.E. 1992, 24855). 
 86.  Acuerdo de Cooperación de Evangélicas; Acuerdo de Cooperación de Israelitas; 
Acuerdo de Cooperación con la Islámica; see also Augustin Motilla De La Calle, Ley orgánica de 
libertad religiosa y Acuerdos con las confesiones: experiencia y sugerencias de iure condendo, 
[Organic Law of Religious Freedom and Agreements with Confessions: Experience and Suggestions 
by Iure Condendo], in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y SU REGULACIÒN LEGAL: LA LEY ORGANICA 
DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA 576, 585 (Rafael Navarro-Valls et al. eds., Iustel 2009) (Spain). 
 87.  Combalía & Roca, supra note 67, at 632. 
 88.  Id. See generally C.E., B.O.E. n.81, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (stating that the 
implementation of the Constitutional principles should take place through organic laws) (“1. 
Organic laws are those relating to the development of fundamental rights and public liberties, 
those which establish Statutes of Autonomy and the general electoral system, and other laws 
provided in the constitution.”). For a more detailed overview of the principle of cooperation in 
Spain, see Ana Fernandez-Coronado, Sentido de la cooperación del estado laico en una sociedad 
multirreligiosa [Sense of Cooperation of the Lay State in a Multi-religious Society], in LA 
LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y SU REGULACIÒN LEGAL, supra note 86, at 679. 
 89.  See Fernandez-Coronado, supra note 88. 
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purposes of the organization.90 As a primary effect of the 
registration, the religious group obtains legal capacity. As affirmed by 
the Constitutional Court, this entails “the identification and the 
admission into the legal system of a group of people that aim to 
exercise, with immunity from coercion, their fundamental rights to 
collective exercise of religious freedom, as established in article 5, 
paragraph 1 of the LOLR.”91 
At the same time, registration affects the autonomy and right of 
self-organization of the group.92 According to the  Constitutional 
Court, the recognition of legal capacity confers a peculiar status on 
the entity, which above all is expressed in the full autonomy 
attributed to it by article 6, paragraph 1 of the LOLR.93 This rule 
provides that registered religious entities may establish rules of 
organization, internal regime, and administration of their 
personnel.94 Moreover, the registration produces positive effects on 
the external dimension of religious freedom; members belonging to 
a registered group can more quickly manifest their religious beliefs 
“with immunity from coercion, hindrance or interference of 
any kind.”95 
Finally, the third level of protection is recognized for individuals 
or religious groups that exist in Spain without being enrolled in the 
Register.96 In fact, the registration is not required for free exercise of 
 
 90.  Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 5 para. 2 (B.O.E. 1980, 15955) (Spain) 
(“Registration shall be made by an application, accompanied by a document evidencing the 
foundation roots or establishment in Spain, the expression of the religious purposes, name and 
other identification data, operating regime and representative bodies, with the indication of 
their powers and requirements for their valid designation.”) (English translation by 
the author). 
 91.  S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 65, p. 83) (Spain) (English translation by 
the author). 
 92.  See Maria Elena Olmos Ortega, supra note 70. 
 93.  S.T.C., Feb 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 65, p. 87–88) (Spain). 
 94. Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 6 (“The registered Churches, Confessions 
and Religious Communities will have full autonomy and will be able to establish their own 
rules of organization, the internal regime and personnel regime. These rules, as well as those 
governing their institutions created for the fulfillment of their purposes, may include provisions 
for safeguarding their religious identity and their own character, as well as the due respect for 
their beliefs, without prejudice to the respect of rights and freedoms recognized by the 
constitution, especially those of freedom, equality and non-discrimination.”) (English 
translation by the author). 
 95.  S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 46, p. 88) (Spain). 
 96.  See S.T.C., July 18, 2002 (B.O.E., No. 188, p. 51, 59) (Spain). 
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religion in Spain, which is always guaranteed by Article 16 of the 
Spanish Constitution: “[W]ith no other restriction on their 
expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as 
protected by law.”97 All religious groups benefit not only from the 
general provisions protecting religious manifestation,98 but also from 
the prerogatives derived from the right of association guaranteed by 
Article 22 of the Spanish Constitution.99 
As in the Italian system, in the Spanish system it cannot be said 
that religious denominations have a right to stipulate a cooperative 
agreement with the State.100 The agreement is not a constitutional 
requirement, nor does the text of the law itself leave room for a 
different outcome. In particular, the expression “where 
appropriate”101 leaves a margin of discretion to the government in 
the interest and convenience of starting negotiations.102 The 
government can decide, according to reasonable motivations but 
within the margin of its discretion, which deeply rooted religious 
denominations may benefit from cooperation with the State through 
an agreement. The administrative decision falls de facto outside the 
judicial review, provided that it does not constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination.103 In fact, there are registered religious 
denominations, like Jehovah’s Witnesses or The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, that have been recognized as deeply 
rooted in Spain but were unable to conclude any agreement. 
 
 97.  Martínez-Torrón, supra note 77, at 717 n.10 (quoting C.E., B.O.E. n. 16, Dec. 
29, 1978 (Spain)). 
 98.  Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 2. 
 99.  C.E., B.O.E. art. 22 para. 1, Dec. 29, 1978 (“The right of association 
is recognized.”). 
 100.  See Miguel Rodríguez Blanco, Il Principio di Laicità in Spagna, STATO, CHIESE E 
PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE 1–2, n.1 (2011) (Spain) (quoting C.E., B.O.E. art. 16, Dec. 
29, 1978 (Spain)). 
 101.  Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 7 (B.O.E. 1980, 15955) (Spain), 
http://bit.ly/QpA4Ld (“The State, taking into account the religious beliefs existing in 
Spanish society, shall, where appropriate, establish agreements or cooperation agreements with 
the Churches, Confessions and Religious Communities registered in the Register whose area 
and number of believers have reached deeply rooted in Spain. In any case, these agreements 
must be approved by Act of Parliament.”) (English translation by author). 
 102.  Motilla De la Calle, supra note 86, at 850, 851. 
 103.  Id. 
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C. A Right to be Registered as a Right of Religious Freedom 
Though the wording of LOLR excludes a claim to enter into an 
agreement with the State, a different issue is whether there exists a 
right for a religion to be registered in the Registry of Religious 
Entities. As mentioned above, the registration not only constitutes a 
condition to conclude an arrangement with the State but also, and 
with no less importance, grants to a religious entity a favored status 
and related benefits. 
This issue of registration was the object of an important decision 
of the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2001.104 The case originated 
from the request of the Church of Unification, also referred to as the 
Moon Sect, to officially register as a religious group.105 The 
administrative authorities refused the application, arguing that the 
Moon Sect was not a religious group but rather a “dangerous sect” 
carrying out activities contrary to the public order.106 Regarding the 
application for enrollment in the Registry, the court held that the 
administrative authorities must act in a space strictly regulated by law 
and that the authorities have no room for discretion.107 The 
administrative authorities have no margin to decide whether or not 
to grant the request and, in particular, have no authority to examine 
the religious nature of any group that has applied to register.108 On 
the contrary, public authorities should verify only the formal 
presence of the requisites listed in article 5, paragraph 2 of LOLR109 
and ensure that the group is not one of those excluded by article 
3, paragraph 2.110 
 
 104.  S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 46/2001, p. 83) (Spain). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 89 (“[L]a Administración responsable de dicho instrumento no se mueve en 
un ámbito de discrecionalidad que le apodere con un cierto margen de apreciación para 
acordar o no la inscripción solicitada.”). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 5 para. 2 (B.O.E. 1980, 15955) (Spain). 
 110.  Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 3 para. 2 (B.O.E. 1980, 15955) (Spain) 
(“Activities, purposes and entities relating to or engaging in the study of and experimentation 
with psychic or parapsychological phenomena or the dissemination of humanistic or 
spiritualistic values or other similar non-religious aims do not qualify for the protection 
provided in this Act.”). 
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According to the Constitutional Court, the registration is 
designed to facilitate the collective exercise of the right to religious 
freedom.111 The registration is an instrument ordered to make rights 
real and effective, to “remove obstacles,” and to promote the 
conditions for freedom and equality of individuals and groups.112 As 
such, it must not suffer further limitations than those necessary to 
safeguard public order, such as the protection of fundamental human 
rights, public health, security, and morality. According to the 
decision, the improper refusal to accommodate the registration 
requested is an unwarranted obstacle that undermines the full 
exercise of the fundamental right of religious freedom.113 
Furthermore, it involves an unjustified disadvantage when compared 
to the faith-based organizations that have obtained official status and 
the connected benefits114. 
To summarize, in Spain, because registration is a function of the 
protection of religious freedom, the government does not enjoy a 
margin of discretion to deny religious organizations who apply to be 
registered. Moreover, any restriction must be justified for the 
protection of public order and must be considered with 
strict scrutiny.115 
CONCLUSION 
The Spanish Constitutional Court considers enrollment in the 
official Register to be a tool to ensure easier and effective enjoyment 
of religious freedom.116 Accordingly, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court held that religious groups have a right to access the more 
favorable status granted by the registration. Registration can be 
refused only for the absence of the formal prerequisites required by 
the law, and the administrative decision will be under the strict 
scrutiny of the judicial power.117 Otherwise, an improper refusal 
 
 111.  S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001 (B.O.E., No. 46/2001, p. 83, 89) (Spain). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  On the contrary, the four dissenting judges excluded that the inscription in the 
Registry is part of the essential content of the freedom of religion. Id. at 91–94. 
 116.  Id. at 89. 
 117.  Id. 
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would give registered groups an unfair advantage over those to 
whom the same request was denied.118 In Spain, the presence of a 
general law regarding religious freedom permitted the Constitutional 
Court to reduce the margin of discretion of the public authority. In 
Italy, the lack of this general regulation seems to have prevented the 
Italian Constitutional Court from reaching a similar result.119 
Therefore, it is still unclear whether the Italian approach 
guarantees adequate protection of religious denominations’ interests. 
Currently, the State uses agreements to grant a general set of rights 
that express the general needs of all religions to “recognized 
denominations.” These general rights could conceivably compose 
the content of a general law on religious freedom or at least of a new 
version of the law on admitted cults.120 Some commentators argue 
that this de facto tendency is problematic in light of the principle of 
non-discrimination.121 Because the agreement has become a sort of 
general law, religious denominations left without an agreement 
cannot benefit from these general provisions. In this way, 
unrecognized denominations are treated inequitably.122 Moreover, 
because a general religious freedom law has not yet been enacted in 
Italy, the agreement is the only way for a religious denomination to 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.   
The conclusion might have been different, also with regard to the question raised by 
this dispute, had the legislator decided through an act of discretion to introduce 
comprehensive regulation of the procedure governing the conclusion of concordats, 
laying down also objective parameters suitable for guiding the Government as 
regards its choice of interlocutor. Were this to occur, compliance with those 
restrictions would constitute a prerequisite for the legitimacy and validity of the 
choices made by the Government, which could be reviewed in the 
appropriate fora . . . .  
Corte Cost., 10 marzo 2016, n.52, G.U. 2016 (It.). 
 120.  Jlia Pasquali Cerioli, L’approvazione delle intese ex art. 8, 3° comma, Cost. nella XVI 
legislatura: luci e ombre di una nuova «stagione», 2 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA 
ECCLESIASTICA 404, 405 (2013) (It.). 
 121.  Annamaria Poggi, Una sentenza “preventiva” sulle prossime richieste di Intese da 
parte di confessioni religiose?, FEDERALISMI.IT, Mar. 2016, at 2 (It.). 
 122.  Colaianni, supra note 38, at 9; see also Nicola Colaianni, Le intese nella società 
multireligiosa: verso nuove disuguaglianze?, STATO, CHIESE E PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE, 
May 2012, at 7 (It.). 
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avoid the restrictive limits of the illiberal law on admitted cults, the 
legge sui culti ammessi of 1929. 123 
This means that the religious denominations that do not 
successfully enter into an agreement are excluded from the more 
favourable provisions and from the benefits reserved for “agreed 
religions.”124 The absence of any procedural limit to the discretionary 
powers of the Government can easily result in discrimination against 
denominations excluded from the agreements. 
In this regard, the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) can provide some reflections. The ECtHR 
has repeatedly stated that a state enjoys a broad margin of 
appreciation in the matters of church-state relations.125 Nevertheless, 
this “does not mean that the relations between a Contracting State 
and religious communities lie completely outside the Court’s 
scrutiny.”126 According to the ECtHR, “the conclusion of 
agreements between the State and a particular religious community 
establishing a special regime in favour of the latter, does not, in 
principle, contravene the requirements of Articles 9 and 14 of the 
Convention,” provided that the principle of non-discrimination is 
respected.127 This means that there must be “an objective and 
reasonable justification for the difference in treatment and . . . similar 
agreements may be entered into by other religious communities 
wishing to do so.”128 This concept is explained by Judge Tulkens:  
[P]ublic authorities are under no obligation to provide an identical 
legal status to each community. Nevertheless, the Court will 
control with severity the conformity with the Convention of 
advantages granted exclusively to one religious community. Any 
advantage conferred to a religious community to the exclusion 
 
 123.  Canonico, supra note 20, at 2. 
 124.  Ferrari & Ferrari, supra note 5, at 455. 
 125.  Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 204. 
 126.  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S CASE-LAW 
ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION 15 (2013), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research
_report_religion_ENG.pdf. 
 127.  Savez Crkava v. Croatia, App. No. 7798/08, ¶ 85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 9, 2010), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["SavezCrkava"],"documentcollectionid2"
:["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-102173"]}. 
 128.  Id.; see also Alujer Fernández v. Spain, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 7. 
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of  the others must rest on a legitimate justification and 
remain  proportionate.129 
Regarding the assignment of a particular status to a religious 
denomination, the ECtHR has reiterated under Article 9 of the 
Convention that state authorities have an obligation to remain 
neutral when exercising their powers in this domain.130 Accordingly, 
if a state sets up a framework for granting preferential legal status to 
religious groups, all religious groups must have a fair opportunity to 
apply for this status.131 The criteria established must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner, especially when the privilege and “the 
advantage obtained by religious societies is substantial and this 
special treatment undoubtedly facilitates a religious society’s 
pursuance of its religious aims.”132 In any case, the imposition of such 
criteria in this delicate matter, calls for particular scrutiny on the part 
of the court.133 
In conclusion, under current Italian Constitutional Court 
precedent, a religious entity has no right to negotiate with the Italian 
government in an attempt to enter into an agreement with the State. 
In this context, the Italian government enjoys broad political 
discretion. Although under the Spanish system, like the Italian 
system, there is no right to sign an agreement with the State under 
the LOLR, the Spanish Constitutional Court has reached a different 
outcome than the Italian Constitutional Court with respect to a 
religious group’s right to access and enroll in the official Register. 
According to the Spanish Constitutional Court, the Spanish 
government does not enjoy discretion when assessing a religious 
entity’s registration claim. Rather, any religious group that meets the 
formal requirements prescribed by the law has the right to access the 
 
 129.  Francoise Tulkens, The European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State 
Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2575, 2585 (2009). 
 130.  Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No 40825/98, ¶ 92 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. July 31, 2008), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext"
:["religionsgemeinschaft"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]
,"itemid":["001-88022"]}. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. ¶ 97. 
3.Ervas_FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete) 2/6/2018  3:53 PM 
869 Agreements Between Church and State 
 893 
Register because the purpose of the registration process is to 
promote the full enjoyment of religious freedom.  
After the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, the UAAR 
decided to bring its claim before the ECtHR.134 In the Italian system, 
religious denominations without an agreement suffer under a legal 
regime that denies them many of the rights that recognized religions 
enjoy. The Italian legal landscape is characterized by the absence of a 
general law on religious freedom, the existence of a law on admitted 
cults dating back to the Dictatorial Period, and broad governmental 
discretion. Moreover, the Italian system, in which the Italian 
government enjoys complete discretion over the agreements process, 
does not protect collective religious rights as required by the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Although the ECtHR has 
not ruled on the question of whether Italy’s system violates 
principles of the European Convention, there appears to be a 
legitimate argument that they do, particularly the principle of 
non discrimination. 
  
 
 134.  The application has been brought before the Strasbourg Court but details are not 
yet available. See the declaration of Mr. Carcano, UAAR’s Representative, after the decision of 
the Italian Constitutional Court, available at https://blog.uaar.it/2016/03/11/corte-costitu
zionale-legittimo-no-governo-intesa-uaar/. 
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